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facing the foreclosure crisis  
in greater cleveland:
What happened and how communities are responding
This report was produced by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. 
 
The views expressed herein are those of the individual authors; they do not necessarily 
reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or the Federal Reserve System.
The foreclosure crisis is among the most significant challenges  
facing American cities today. It has been difficult as a nation to 
assess the damage to housing stock, neighborhoods, and communi-
ties, let alone decide upon strategies to repair and move forward. 
As new foreclosures continue to mount, their impact spreads from 
central cities to places that initially seemed immune. Indeed, we 
use the term “foreclosure crisis” broadly in this report, including the 
subprime lending meltdown, foreclosures themselves, and spillover 
effects such as vacant and abandoned properties as elements of this 
crisis. In the midst of any crisis, it can be difficult to step back, take 
stock, and begin to mitigate the damage. But leaders in Northeast 
Ohio have done just that, acting quickly to develop and launch initia-
tives, both innovative and collaborative, in Cleveland and Cuyahoga 
County to address the crisis. Cuyahoga County may be the epicenter 
of the foreclosure crisis, but it is also nationally recognized as a place 
aggressively working on many fronts to make its way forward.
Using data that track properties from loan origination through fore-
closure, REO, and disposition, this report documents the unfolding 
of the foreclosure crisis in Northeast Ohio and the enormous toll 
to date. The report also documents some of the multi-faceted local 
responses. Sidebars contain stories of community leaders, organiza-
tions, and agencies that have come together to begin repairing the 
damage and prevent properties from further demise.
Cleveland is an opportune subject for study for three reasons. One, 
the crisis emerged here early and with starkly visible impact. Indeed, 
media attention from around the world has focused on Cleveland—in 
particular the Slavic Village neighborhood that has been devastated 
by predatory lending, foreclosures, and vandalism. Two, Cleveland’s 
strong community development organizations were well organized 
and ready to respond promptly to the crisis. Having weathered the 
loss of jobs and exodus of people to the suburbs, Cleveland had 
already begun tackling the challenges of vacant housing and a 
shrinking city. It was one of the first sites in the nation to work with 
the National Vacant Properties Campaign, creating a blueprint for 
strategically addressing neighborhood revitalization. And three, local 
researchers, building on their longstanding involvement in housing 
and neighborhood studies, were well positioned to do timely research 
on the dynamics of the problem and to document the array of  
responses. Their research, in fact, forms the basis of this report.
The problems of weak-market cities—those that fell behind in 
economic and population growth, suffered a resulting over-supply of 
housing, and are now among the hardest hit by this crisis—may seem 
intractable. Yet our chronicling of what happened in the Cleveland 
area suggests that the latest blow to these vulnerable communities 
was not inevitable. We show, for example, that a huge expansion of 
subprime credit took place in communities that previously had very 
little access to credit. These subprime loans foreclosed at a much 
higher rate and triggered an avalanche of vacant properties, many 
of which have been abandoned by lenders or sold to speculators at 
extremely distressed prices.
Despite the severity of the problem here, Clevelanders have exhibited 
a strength and willful perseverance, exemplified by the city’s multi-
faceted, coordinated, and extensive response to the crisis. Journalist 
Alex Kotlowitz visited several hard-hit cities across the country before 
deciding to write about the devastation in the Slavic Village neigh-
borhood of Cleveland. (His article “All Boarded Up” was published 
in the New York Times Magazine on March 8, 2009.) Kotlowitz 
returned to Cleveland in June 2009 to participate in a forum on the 
foreclosure crisis. At this event he explained why he chose Cleveland 
to profile: It was “the one place in the country where I saw people 
pushing back.”
This report is Cleveland’s story. The outcomes are uncertain and the 
path ahead is still very difficult. We feel there is decided value in  
sharing our story now, while the crisis is still playing out. The value 
lies in what Cleveland’s example can contribute to other communi-
ties’ efforts to deal with foreclosures and their aftermath. We also 
hope that our story can further policy discussion about what will be 
needed in the future to avert another such crisis.
We are grateful to have partnered with the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland to produce this report. If crisis indeed breeds opportunity, 
now is an ideal time to build knowledge about collaborative strate-
gies, policies, and programs that contribute to sustainability for 
metropolitan areas.
June 2010
“You’ve seen things, you’ve heard things, 
and you’ve felt things that most of us haven’t,” 
journalist Alex Kotlowitz pointed out.
“It is incumbent on you to share [that] with the 
rest of the country. In your hands is not the future  
of one house or one block or even one city.  
You need to be the guides. I urge you to give voice  
to what you’ve seen.”
Letter from Claudia Coulton  
and Kathy Hexter
Kathryn Wertheim Hexter, left, from Cleveland State University and  
Claudia J. Coulton, PhD, from Case Western Reserve University
Much has been written about the foreclosure crisis in Northeast Ohio. With a four-fold increase in foreclosures 
from 1995 to 2007 and entire neighborhoods decimated by vacant and abandoned homes, Cuyahoga County—
one of the epicenters of the nation’s foreclosure crisis—has served as a striking example of the devastation 
wrought by the mortgage lending meltdown. Existing research largely focuses on distinct components of the 
problem during a specific time period. Absent from much of the research published on foreclosures in this region 
are the local responses—some traditional, others highly innovative—to the crisis. This deficit has left unanswered 
the following key questions: What are community groups and local governments doing to address the crisis and 
its spillover effects, among them a glut of vacant and abandoned homes? And what is being done to prevent a 
future occurrence of similar magnitude?1
This report attempts to articulate two things. One, it spells out what happened here, relating the symptoms and 
progressive stages of the crisis as it played out across the region—from bad loans to defaults and foreclosures, 
and then beyond foreclosure—based on research by the Center on Urban Poverty and Community Development 
at Case Western Reserve University. And two, it points to representative examples of programs developed and 
implemented locally to address particular aspects of the crisis, drawing from multiple reports by the Levin College 
of Urban Affairs at Cleveland State University and local organizations.2
Like the rest of the nation, Northeast Ohio is still very much in the midst of the crisis. It may well be years before 
this region emerges from its massive tangle. However, in sharing the story now of what happened here, along with 
specific strategies employed to address the crisis at different stages, we may provide cities experiencing similar 
problems with ideas for tackling them in their regions.
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To establish some context for what happened here in Northeast 
Ohio, it is worth considering that the region’s housing market never 
fully recovered from the previous recession. The region overall has 
endured decades of sprawl, declining population in its central  
cities, racially segregated neighborhoods, and persistent poverty in some areas. The cycle of credit expansion–
boom–bust nevertheless did take place under these conditions as subprime credit became available in lower-
income communities, while home prices remained fairly stable. So while the region participated fully in the lending 
boom, it was mainly a bystander to the housing boom.
Typically, housing markets experience a low level of mortgage delinquencies, foreclosures, vacancies, and abandoned 
properties. Most markets also have mechanisms that transfer those properties to another owner or to an alterna-
tive use, so that fewer abandoned and nuisance properties are left outstanding. For example, lenders modify loans, 
builders reduce housing starts, and money-losing lenders are acquired or shut down. The inverted-pyramid graphic 
below illustrates this process. In addition, community groups help facilitate counseling, demolition, and other efforts. 
Cleveland is no exception; the city is known for its strong and longstanding network of community development organi-
zations. Since the recent disruption to the housing market occurred at such a massive scale, however, those standard 
mechanisms have not been able to keep up with the inflow of impaired loans and vacant properties.
When the flow of properties from one stage into the next increases at a faster rate than the cycle can accommo-
date, exit mechanisms weaken and spillover effects feed back into the top of the pyramid, causing it to become 
bottom-heavy. This exacerbates the cycle of disruption and prevents the market from recovery. The volume of 
delinquent loans, foreclosures, and vacant, abandoned, and real-estate-owned (REO) properties in Northeast Ohio 
markets quickly overwhelmed the region’s existing resources, creating a crisis situation for many communities. 
As the crisis hit Northeast Ohio, community organizations increased their efforts and came up with new ways to 
respond. In addition, government officials initiated public intervention on a number of levels to help contain the 
effects. Collaborative programs involving city government, local CDCs, funders, and residents have been revitalizing 
areas of Cleveland once replete with vacant and abandoned properties.
Such programs underscore the tremendous value of partnerships in helping to revitalize local communities. These 
and other strategies for addressing the effects of the foreclosure crisis continue to be developed and implemented 
at the local, regional, and state levels (see sidebars throughout report). 
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Housing Market Cycles 
and Typical Responses
Adapted in part from the Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank’s 2008 Annual Report essay, “Breaking the Housing 
Crisis Cycle,” published May 2009.
Delinquency 
Default
Foreclosure 
Vacant
REO 
Vacant
Abandoned 
Nuisance
• Counseling, foreclosure prevention, loss 
mitigation programs
• Supply and demand adjustments
• Sale/purchase assistance programs
• Land banks
• Rehabilitation (private, nonprofits)
• Demolition
Pyramid illustrates the flow of properties from one stage to the next. 
Dotted edge indicates a higher inter-stage flow in times of duress.
Rationale: Why the Focus on Northeast Ohio?
The story of how the foreclosure crisis unfolded in Northeast 
Ohio is unique. The crisis hit an already weakened region hard. 
For years leading up to the current crisis, Northeast Ohio, 
similar to many weak markets, had seen declining population in 
its central cities, increasing sprawl, and rising vacancy rates in 
some neighborhoods. Unlike in the nation’s stronger markets—
Florida and California, for example, which saw credit expand-
ing to the middle-income suburbs—Northeast Ohio, home to 
Cuyahoga County and the City of Cleveland, experienced the 
subprime credit expansion largely in low- and moderate-income 
communities that had had little access to credit in the past (Mian 
and Sufi 2008). The region also did not see housing prices 
increase dramatically, in contrast to many of the nation’s stronger 
markets. That means, among other things, that borrowers did 
not have the ability to refinance out of loans whose payments 
they could not keep up with. 
Also unique is the fact that the crisis became apparent earlier 
in the Cleveland region than in stronger markets. Foreclosures 
here doubled between 1995 and 2001 and then doubled again 
by 2007 (see figure 1). As early as the late 1990s leaders in the 
area were voicing concerns over subprime lending, which they 
thought to be responsible for the increase in foreclosure filings, 
especially in communities where housing values were low. 
In the aftermath of a sustained surge of foreclosures, many of 
the region’s communities have continued to grapple with scores 
of vacant and abandoned properties, dwindling tax bases, and 
decreased property values. Foreclosure filings, of course, are only 
one symptom of the mortgage crisis. Concentrations of foreclosed 
homes have led to a greater level of devastation for certain areas 
in the county, and in some Cleveland neighborhoods in particu-
lar. Consider that as of August 2009, Cleveland had more homes 
slated for demolition than twice the city’s entire allotment of 
Neighborhood Stabilization Program funds could cover.
On the plus side, Cleveland is also highly regarded for its strong 
network of community-based organizations. These entities, 
along with local government, have long been engaged in data-
driven approaches to local problems and issues, with critical 
access to data provided by a unique integrated property informa-
tion system, NEO CANDO (see Making Data Accessible). In 
fact, Cleveland was one of the first sites in the nation reaching 
out to and tapping the expertise of the National Vacant Proper-
ties Campaign to address the problem of vacant properties (see 
Vacant and Abandoned Properties Action Council) (Mallach, 
Levy, and Schilling 2005). City officials and leaders from across 
the country have been in touch with local CDCs and researchers 
to learn what approaches Cleveland has developed in addressing 
different facets of the problem, and which show promise. 
Examining how the crisis played out in Northeast Ohio is 
important because the national story does not reflect what hap-
pened here. As noted above, differences exist in how the crisis 
affected weak versus strong markets. These differences have 
significant implications for policymakers, because approaches 
developed for one region may not be suitable for others.
This report is organized to reflect distinct stages of the foreclo-
sure crisis and beyond: stage one, from a loan origination to a 
foreclosure filing; stage two, from a foreclosure filing to a fore-
closure sale and REO; and stage three, out of REO and beyond. 
 Making Data Accessible
Good data are hard to come by. Good thing for researchers and 
practitioners in Northeast Ohio, then, that NEO CANDO exists. Simply 
put, NEO CANDO—it stands for Northeast Ohio Community and 
Neighborhood Data for Organizing—is a web-based neighborhood data 
information system that makes comprehensive local data available 
to anyone (http://neocando.case.edu). Hosted by the Center on 
Urban Poverty and Community Development at Case Western Reserve 
University, NEO CANDO secures and assimilates public data from 
many different governmental departments. The data are then easily 
accessible in a single location. Features include social and economic 
data (crime counts, poverty rates, birth rates, etc.), property data 
(property transfers, foreclosure filings, sheriff’s sales, mortgages, 
etc.), and a mapping function. Most data are available for a range of 
geographic areas, including census tract and block-level boundaries, 
as well as defined local areas like neighborhoods, political wards, and 
city-planning districts. 
The data are updated regularly, which allows for the identification 
and examination of trends in current and developing issues. Users 
can make charts and maps. There’s even a web-based tutorial to 
instruct new users. And it’s not just easy to access; NEO CANDO 
data provide the basis for meaningful academic and policy research, 
as well as community groups’ targeted efforts to stem foreclosures 
and stabilize neighborhoods. 
NEO CANDO data has been a critical component of many on-
the-ground efforts to combat the foreclosure crisis. For example, 
community practitioners use data from the system to create lists of 
homes that are likely to be foreclosed on, and then direct foreclosure-
prevention outreach to these at-risk homeowners. Practitioners have 
also used information from NEO CANDO to estimate which foreclo-
sure filings are on rental properties and then forewarn those proper-
ties’ current renters. In similar fashion, Cuyahoga County officials 
took advantage of NEO CANDO data and technical assistance when 
planning local foreclosure counseling events, strategically locating 
these events in venues accessible to the largest number of distressed 
borrowers. 
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“Our work is about democratizing data for neighborhood change,” 
says Michael Schramm, NEO CANDO’s chief programmer.
“We aim to make the data straightforward, understandable,  
and easily available to the public.”
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Figure 1. Foreclosure Filings in Cuyahoga County, 1995-2009
Along the way we highlight a number of approaches developed by 
local CDCs, nonprofit organizations, funders, and government 
to help communities deal with properties at each stage. These 
programs represent a range of solutions developed in response to 
Northeast Ohio’s foreclosure crisis; given the wide array of activi-
ties in the Cleveland region, we could not cover all in this report.
Stage I: The Road to Foreclosure
With Northeast Ohio’s economic conditions still weakened in the 
early 2000s, several factors helped fuel the region’s smoldering 
foreclosure problem. As figure 1 below illustrates, the number of 
foreclosure filings in Cuyahoga County more than quadrupled 
between 1995 and 2007 (Schiller and Hirsh 2008). 
And this four-fold increase in filings hit some communities harder 
than others. The map below shows foreclosure filings as a percent of 
all residential properties in a given census tract. The data reveal that 
one-fifth of all census tracts in Cuyahoga County have seen as many 
as 21 to 50 percent of their properties touched by foreclosure.3
Early on, community leaders and local researchers suspected 
subprime lending of being a factor in the area’s soaring foreclo-
sure rates (Lind 2008). There was no reprieve from either any 
time soon. The continuing downward slide of housing prices 
and interest rate resets on subprime loans4 every couple of years 
meant that foreclosures would continue their precipitous climb 
(Schloemer et al. 2006).
Figure 2. Percent of Unduplicated Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Filings 
 (Cleveland and Cuyahoga County, Jan 1, 2006–Oct 15, 2009)
Source: Policy Matters Ohio, 2008.
Source: Cuyahoga County Clerk of Courts, accessed 
from NEO CANDO (http://neocando.case.edu).
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Vacant and Abandoned Properties Action Council
In 2004, Cleveland became one of the first sites to engage the services of the National Vacant  
Properties Campaign, a national partnership among Smart Growth America, Local Initiatives Support 
Corporation, the Metropolitan Institute at Virginia Tech, and the Genesee Institute that helps local 
areas plan and strategize efforts to reclaim and remediate their vacant property. After assessing 
Cleveland’s situation, the National Vacant Properties Campaign published a report describing the 
problem of vacant and abandoned properties here and made several recommendations for solutions. 
(The report is titled “Cleveland at the Crossroads: Turning Abandonment into Opportunity.”) Prompted 
by the campaign’s assessment and recommendations, community development corporations, local 
city, suburban, and county governments, funders, and local universities came together to create 
VAPAC, the Vacant and Abandoned Properties Action Council, to marshal existing local resources to 
address the problem of vacant properties in Northeast Ohio. 
“VAPAC was created to explore solutions to vacant property issues,  
share information on new challenges and successes, and help coordinate  
activities to make efficient use of scarce resources,” 
says Frank Ford, the group’s chair. 
VAPAC facilitates communication within and across different levels of government, and helps agen-
cies avoid duplicating services. The diversity of the group also ensures foreclosure- and property-
related activities are applicable and appropriate both on the ground, working with families facing 
foreclosure, and on a policy level. In addition to the regular VAPAC meetings, topical working groups 
have explored specific issues in greater depth. 
Besides ensuring efficiency among parties working in the field and sharing knowledge on related 
policy issues, VAPAC has created a code of conduct for owners of REO property, developed guidelines 
for municipal CRA agreements, and sponsored a Cuyahoga County-wide code enforcement summit 
on foreclosure and vacant property. 
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A Telltale Starting Point
Studying mortgage loans that went into foreclosure from 2005 
to early 2009 in Cleveland and Cuyahoga County, the CWRU 
researchers arrived at some compelling conclusions. For one, 
subprime loans are by far the most common starting point on 
the pathway to foreclosure in Cuyahoga County. The researchers 
also found differences among borrowers of different races, both 
in the rates of receiving subprime loans and in the rates of fore-
closure. Overall, they concluded, the road from loan origination 
is far more likely to lead to foreclosure for minority borrowers 
than for others (Coulton et al. 2008).5
Using matching techniques to link HMDA mortgage records with 
locally recorded mortgage documents and foreclosure filings, they 
examined mortgage loans made in Cuyahoga County in 2005, 
2006, and 2007 that foreclosed between 2005 and early 2009, 
considering numerous factors that could have influenced whether 
a loan defaulted or not.6 As noted above, their results showed that 
the strongest predictor—by far—of a loan foreclosing is its status 
as a subprime loan. In fact, holding other factors constant, home 
purchase loans that were subprime had an 816 percent higher 
chance of going into foreclosure than other loans (Coulton et al. 
2008). 
Nationally, subprime lending enjoyed stunning growth from 
the late 1990s into the next decade, quadrupling its share of the 
market in just over 10 years. In 1994, subprime loans constituted 
less than 5 percent of mortgage originations across the nation; 
by 2005 that proportion had jumped to 20 percent (Gramlich 
2007). In Cuyahoga County, it was even higher, with 22.9  
percent of the county’s 2005 mortgage loans originated by  
subprime lenders (Pleasants and Brown 2007). And in some 
Cleveland neighborhoods, subprime loans accounted for a  
staggering 63 percent of mortgage originations (Nelson 2008).
So why, if these loans were so risky, were so many of them being 
made? Along with greater risk for borrowers, subprime loans car-
ried higher costs, both in interest rates and fees, than prime loans. 
But they also had characteristics that appealed to borrowers. For 
instance, the loans required little or no down payment and fea-
tured low introductory interest rates, which help borrowers afford 
initial payments. These borrowers may have held an expectation 
that either their incomes would rise to cover the higher interest 
rates upon reset or that they would be able to refinance before the 
higher monthly payments kicked in. 
Brokers also found subprime loans hugely attractive. For one, they 
earned higher fees for originating subprime loans. Two, subprime 
loans were an instrument by which mortgage brokers could expand 
their business by making credit available to a previously untapped 
market of riskier borrowers. But a third factor was also at work: 
the expansion of securitization. In securitization, lenders bundled 
subprime loans with other less-risky loans into asset-backed 
mortgage securities; these bundled loans were then rated and sold 
on Wall Street to investors looking to acquire real estate holdings 
without the risk of purchasing only subprime mortgages outright 
(Ergungor 2008). Investors also found these attractive. Intense 
demand for mortgage-backed securitized loans meant that not only 
mortgage brokers, but appraisers, rating agencies, and securities 
traders as well could be less rigid in adhering to their own industry 
standards, since each was essentially extracting a transaction fee 
and then passing along the risk to the next interested party. This 
passing-the-buck game ended with the catastrophic implosion 
of the subprime lending market in late 2007 (Cutts and Merrill 
2008). 
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Figure 3. Estimated Proportion of Home Purchase Loans Still Intact*
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Higher and Faster to Default
It stands to reason that subprime loans will default at higher 
rates than traditional loans, and more quickly, too. Indeed, 
subprime loans accounted for 81 percent of all foreclosures from 
2005 to 2007 in Cuyahoga County. Data show that subprime 
loans go into default a short time after origination, with signifi-
cant numbers occurring early in the second year and as the third 
year begins (see figure 3) (Coulton et al. 2008).
One reasonable approach to avoiding default and foreclosure is 
to start with mortgage loans that are more suited to a borrower’s 
ability to repay. Third Federal Savings and Loan in Cleveland 
developed low-cost lending products available even to low-
income buyers in tandem with a homebuyer education program 
(see Responsible Neighborhood Lending). The program, called 
Home Today, requires attendance at classes before an individual 
even signs a purchase agreement. Classes are aimed at helping 
prospective homeowners understand the significant respon-
sibilities, costs, and risks associated with owning a home. The 
program also spells out the myriad mortgage products available, 
helping prospective buyers make sense of their options. 
Two other findings stood out in CWRU’s study of mortgage 
loans in Cleveland and Cuyahoga County. First, the lenders who 
made these subprime loans are predominantly independent 
mortgage companies, or IMCs. A study by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Cleveland has similar findings. Lending institutions 
regulated by the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) origi-
nated very few of the subprime loans, regardless of borrower 
income. Figure 4 shows the concentration of subprime mortgage 
loans made by IMCs per 1,000 units of housing in Cuyahoga 
County. The map shows the highest concentration of loans on 
the east side of the city of Cleveland, and extending out to east-
ern suburbs (Nelson 2009).
The data tell a disheartening story: While 223 individual lenders 
made and foreclosed on at least one subprime loan that went to 
foreclosure during the study period, the researchers found that 
only a few originators account for the majority of foreclosures 
(see figure 5). These top 20 lenders originated 14,412 subprime 
loans; 66 percent of all subprime loans originated in Cuyahoga 
County. In addition, 75 percent of all subprime loans that ended 
in foreclosure were originated by one of these 20 lenders. To 
cite one example, Long Beach Mortgage, whose loan portfo-
lio was made up almost entirely of subprime lending (99.34 
percent), originated the seventh-highest number of subprime 
loans in Cuyahoga County from 2005 to 2007. Of those loans, 
65 percent went into foreclosure. Long Beach Mortgage—now 
defunct, like many of its peers in the industry—operated out of 
Anaheim, California (Coulton et al. 2008).
Second, the researchers found marked disparities among races 
both in the originations of subprime loans and in related fore-
closures. African Americans, compared with whites of similar 
income, held subprime loans two to four times more often than 
their white counterparts, leading to high rates of foreclosure 
among this population (see figure 6). In fact, the highest income 
bracket showed the largest disparity, with African Americans 
holding 4.2 times as many subprime loans as whites. 
Figure 4. Concentration of High-Cost Loans Made by Independent Mortgage Companies, 2006
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9Responsible Neighborhood Lending
In 2001, Third Federal Savings and Loan launched its Home Today program, aimed at supporting low-income homeowner-
ship. The comprehensive program features homebuyer education, ongoing support, and an overall focus on sound lending 
practices. Informed decision-making is the crux of the program. Through the Home Today program, homebuyers are 
offered a 30-year, fixed-rate mortgage at lower-than-average interest rates and a discount on closing costs. But before any 
of that happens, participants in the program take part in homebuyer education classes and receive budgeting counseling. 
Before looking at homes or having a conversation with a lender, the prospective homebuyers are taught what to expect in 
buying, financing, and maintaining a home. 
According to its website, Third Federal developed the Home Today program “from a consumer’s perspective to help you 
make informed choices so you won’t feel confused or pressured.” 
The first step for potential homebuyers is finding a 
community sponsor to serve as a character reference. 
Next, the prospective buyer receives training on subjects 
like budgeting, establishing and maintaining credit, and 
shopping for a home mortgage loan. These educational 
workshops are done in partnership with (and held at) 
local community development corporations throughout 
Cleveland. Once an individual completes all required 
sessions, he or she is automatically approved for a home 
mortgage loan based on income. And Third Federal ser-
vices its own mortgage loans. In fact, the bank has never 
sold the servicing of a single mortgage in its six decades of doing business. Support provided through the Home Today 
program—both pre- and post-purchase—helps ensure success for low-income homeowners. “Every homebuyer has a 
financial counselor going through the program,” says Martines. “That counselor keeps in touch with the buyer and his 
or her family in case they encounter any problems or have any questions or issues.” 
Since the program’s inception in 2001, more than 100 partners have steered some 13,000 potential homebuyers to 
Home Today seminars. More than 4,000 have become homeowners. 
“We operate by a specific set of values— 
concern for others, trust, and respect— 
and by our mission, which is to create value for  
our customers and our communities,”
says Third Federal’s Monica Martines. 
“To do that, we make loans to people who can  
become successful homeowners.”
A Contagious Effect
As we’ve seen happen in cities across the country, foreclosures 
beget other foreclosures, in part through their negative effect on 
surrounding property values (Mikelbank 2008). In Cleveland, 
this has led to a geographic pattern of foreclosure—particularly 
on the city’s east side—in which minority neighborhoods have 
been more affected by subprime lending that led to foreclosure. 
Figure 7 (page 13) shows subprime foreclosures overlaid on a 
map indicating the percent of African American borrowers  
by census tract. The tracts with high proportions of African 
American borrowers are also where large numbers of these  
subprime loans have foreclosed. This suggests that these neigh-
borhoods will face even greater challenges in recovering from 
the crisis (Coulton et al. 2008). 
Racial discrimation in housing and credit has been outlawed 
for decades. However, the disproportionate impact on minority 
groups of subprime lending has prompted calls for legal action and 
a search for better tools to assure more equitable treatment in the 
future. Absent first-hand testimony and access to sensitive lender 
information, a case for racial discrimination in lending relies on 
data alone. Here in the Cleveland area, the Housing Research 
and Advocacy Center has been documenting racial disparities 
in lending since 2004. Unfortunately, insufficient specificity in 
the data hamper efforts to take data-driven action. Loan origi-
nation specifics, such as information about a borrower’s credit 
score, balloon payments, pre-payment penalties, and terms of 
adjustment, could help assess the quality of these loans and track 
performance going forward. Improving the delivery time for 
HMDA data can also help. 
Linking Arms to Fight Foreclosure
In 2005, then, the region found itself facing very serious problems. 
The steep increase in foreclosure filings meant people were losing 
their homes in droves. The huge volumes overwhelmed the court 
system, to the point that it was taking three to five years for a 
foreclosure case to move through the courts. The foreclosures also 
Figure 5. Top 20 Originators of Subprime Loans Originated, 2005-07
Originator
On HUD  
Subprime List
%  
Subprime Loans
%
Subprime Loans  
with Foreclosure
Argent Yes 87.34 45.74
New Century Mortgage Yes 95.41 55.37
Wells Fargo Certain subsidiaries 36.16 25.02
Countrywide Certain subsidiaries 25.92 22.25
National City Certain subsidiaries 29.00 26.09
Aegis Yes 87.15 47.38
Long Beach Mortgage Yes 99.34 65.22
Option One Mortgage Yes 94.04 43.12
BNC Yes 94.06 46.55
People's Choice Financial Yes 93.52 45.21
Novastar Mortgage Yes 97.96 41.88
Accredited Home Lenders Yes 96.21 34.11
Intervale Mortgage No 87.23 31.95
Chase Certain subsidiaries 96.53 16.45
Southstar Funding Yes 84.67 36.77
Indymac Bank No 55.04 32.27
Equifirst Yes 93.24 27.13
Citi Certain subsidiaries 36.04 5.08
Ameriquest Mortgage Yes 71.17 20.58
Aames Funding Yes 92.88 40.67
Source: HMDA, Loan Origination and Foreclosure Matched Data File.
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spawned a surge of related problems, including vacant properties 
that were lowering neighboring property values, attracting vandals, 
and reducing the tax dollars that city officials desperately needed 
to address these very problems. At the prompting of several subur-
ban mayors and a coalition of inner-ring suburbs, county officials 
joined forces with leaders of several municipalities to take up the 
fight against foreclosures, undertaking two distinct efforts. 
The first was a response to the county’s critical need to expedite 
the foreclosure process. County officials devised an overhaul to 
the judicial foreclosure process, including procedural changes that 
sped up the process and ultimately cleared a longstanding backlog 
of foreclosure cases (Weinstein, Hexter, and Schnoke 2006, 2008). 
A more efficient foreclosure process has several obvious benefits. 
A working paper published in 2008 by Freddie Mac reports that 
costs associated with foreclosure rise significantly with the length 
of the foreclosure timeline. Ideally, the foreclosure procedure 
would be just long enough to avoid the outcomes that incur higher 
costs—vacating or abandoning the home, allowing the property to 
fall into disrepair—yet allow a homeowner enough time to bring 
the loan current, if possible (Cutts and Merrill 2008). 
The second, more strategic effort undertaken by this collabora-
tive of county and municipal officials was broader and more 
far-reaching than streamlining the foreclosure process. This 
second effort facilitated partnerships among area agencies and 
nonprofits to initiate activities, programs, and, where warranted, 
legal action specifically aimed at preventing further foreclosures. 
One such partnership was the Cuyahoga County Foreclosure 
Prevention Initiative, involving 11 county agencies, nine housing 
nonprofits, and numerous municipalities, area lenders, and other 
community advocacy groups. 
Coordinating and implementing the various components of the 
initiative required significant cooperation, skill, and resources. 
Government agencies collaborated across bureaucratic lines of  
authority. Public and nonprofit groups conferred to make sure 
their collective efforts were synchronized and minimally overlap-
ping, and each of the participating groups demonstrated horizon-
tal and vertical collaboration with each other and with the county. 
One critical component of the initiative has been United Way’s 
2-1-1 First Call for Help, a hotline that directs people to social  
services providers for a variety of needs. Callers facing foreclosure 
are connected to participating Northeast Ohio housing counseling 
agencies that serve as a vital link between individual homeowners 
and their lenders (see Foreclosure Counseling: Different Agencies, 
Different Approaches). To distressed area homeowners, 2-1-1 and 
these housing organizations are the welcome, comforting voice, 
face, and provider of foreclosure-prevention assistance. As of 
February 2009, participating agencies had recorded a 53 percent 
success rate at averting foreclosure (Hexter and Schnoke 2009). 
As a drive down some streets in Cleveland reveals, however, 
foreclosure prevention efforts are not nearly enough. Many, 
many delinquent mortgage loans are unable to be saved, either 
through financial counseling of the homeowner, a modification 
of the loan’s terms, or other means. Considering that foreclosure 
filings in Cuyahoga County have numbered between 13,000 
and 15,000 per year for the past four years, the program can help 
only a small percentage of homeowners in distress.
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Figure 6. Type of Loan and Foreclosure by Race and Income*
* Loans originated are home-purchase loans from 2005 through 2007; foreclosures observed are through early 2009.
Source: HMDA, Loan Origination and Foreclosure Matched Data File.
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Foreclosure Counseling: Different 
Agencies, Different Approaches 
To handle the enormous demand for foreclosure counseling, 
Cuyahoga County contracted with four local agencies to provide 
services. All four provide face-to-face, individualized counseling, 
a method that’s been shown to be more effective than alternative 
methods of advising an individual through the foreclosure process. 
Yet beneath the umbrella of that general method—in-person, one on 
one counseling—agencies often employ distinct and innovative  
approaches to achieve similar outcomes. 
Two of the agencies contracted to counsel Cuyahoga County home 
owners are Empowering and Strengthening Ohio’s People, or ESOP, 
and Neighborhood Housing Services of Greater Cleveland (it goes 
by “NHS” for short). Each provides foreclosure prevention counsel-
ing services, but the two have different underlying philosophies. A 
community organizing agency, ESOP specializes in negotiating with 
recalcitrant lenders and servicers to develop contracts that facilitate 
workouts on behalf of homeowners. Unlike ESOP, Neighborhood 
Housing Services is first and foremost an agency that assists people 
in becoming successful homeowners. And similar to the Cleveland 
Housing Network and Community Housing Solutions—the remaining 
two counseling agencies in the County program—NHS’s foreclosure 
prevention counseling grew out of the organization’s original mission. 
ESOP employs an unapologetically aggressive style in helping 
distressed homeowners. Lenders and servicers with a record of 
multiple client complaints become focal points for action. ESOP 
community organizers work with residents to investigate a targeted 
mortgage company’s lending practices, looking for evidence of 
discriminatory and predatory lending. Together with residents, ESOP 
invites the company’s CEO to negotiate a “fair-lending agreement” 
that, among other things, designates a single contact person within 
that company whom ESOP counselors can call on behalf of home-
owners when they’re having trouble with their mortgages. 
Some lenders and loan servicers meet willingly with ESOP and 
residents. If a targeted company does not, ESOP pursues “direct ac-
tion” tactics designed to draw media attention and generate negative 
publicity surrounding the company’s business practices. Afterward, 
the company usually complies. ESOP shares its list of partnering 
companies—those with which ESOP has negotiated the contracts—
with area counseling agencies and United Way’s 2-1-1 Call for Help, 
so that homeowners with mortgages serviced by those companies 
can be steered directly to ESOP for help. 
Neighborhood Housing Services, in addition to providing counseling 
services to Cuyahoga County residents, is also part of the nationwide 
NeighborWorks network and uses this model of foreclosure preven-
tion. As such, the agency can draw on state “rescue” funds (in 
addition to county “rescue” funds) if needed to help home-owners 
prevent foreclosure. 
At Neighborhood Housing Services, homeowners are assigned a 
counselor who collects and processes the details of their case, 
including any circumstances that might trigger foreclosure, such as 
job loss, underemployment, and medical issues. The counselor then 
assesses the homeowner’s situation and explores possible solu-
tions. Foreclosure solutions are not one-size-fits-all, of course, and 
NHS counselors focus on finding a solution—from refinancing the 
mortgage loan to negotiating workouts with a servicer to becoming a 
renter—that will foster sustainable, long-term homeownership for the 
distressed borrower. For Neighborhood Housing Services, the issue 
isn’t just homeownership; it’s appropriate homeownership. 
“What’s best for the homeowner is not always  
staying in the house,”
explains Lou Tisler, executive director of NHS.
“That doesn’t mean that the homeowner shouldn’t  
own a house, just not that house.”
If a Neighborhood Housing Services counselor assigned to a 
distressed homeowner finds that the client does not have the 
wherewithal to be a long-term homeowner, the agency will advise 
the homeowner on rental housing options and, often, will help the 
individual find a new place to live. 
To ESOP counselors, resident empowerment is as vital an outcome 
as foreclosure resolution. “Our goal is really to build leadership with 
the people,” states lead organizer Jenelle Dame. “They come to us 
for foreclosure help, and we providethat service to them. But we also 
try to encourage leadership within them. Resident empowerment 
is an important force for change.”
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The result in Cleveland and Northeast Ohio has been scores and 
scores of unoccupied and abandoned homes. What does that 
mean for individuals, for communities, and for an entire region 
when these properties—many of them aging and poorly main-
tained, and for which there is scant demand owing to the city’s 
declining population—lose their occupants and become vacant? 
The next section of this report details the slow, debilitating 
movement of foreclosed houses through the legal process and 
into vacancy. 
Stage II: Caught in Foreclosure Limbo 
Formally, the foreclosure process results in houses being sold at 
foreclosure sale (referred to as ‘sheriff ’s sale’ in Ohio). In a typical 
market, there is a reasonable demand for properties that emerge 
from the foreclosure process via a public auction. At foreclosure 
sale, it is expected that properties will be sold to buyers who will 
quickly bring them back to occupancy and productive use. But as 
the CWRU report “Foreclosure and Beyond” shows, the progno-
sis for properties in Northeast Ohio coming out of the foreclosure 
process in recent years is grim. 
Prior to this crisis, greater numbers of foreclosed properties 
were being purchased by private buyers (individual people and 
investors) at foreclosure sale. In 2000, for example, private buyers 
made up 35 percent of the market for properties at foreclosure 
sale. Now, almost all properties coming out of foreclosure sale 
enter REO (real-estate-owned) status (see figure 8). Where there 
used to be a sizeable demand for foreclosed properties, there are 
virtually no private buyers at foreclosure sales any longer; private 
buyers made up only 8 percent of the market for foreclosure sales 
in 2008.7 Area banks, too, are largely absent from the local REO 
picture, which is now almost completely dominated by national 
lenders and government sponsored entities (Coulton, Mikelbank, 
and Schramm 2008). What that means is, with less demand for 
foreclosure sale properties, these vacant homes are more likely to 
sit idle and untended. Empty houses are susceptible to looters, 
who readily strip structures of anything with resale value, including 
aluminum siding, copper piping, plumbing fixtures, and wooden 
doors. When finally sold out of REO, they have lost much of their 
market value. 
Figure 9 illustrates the proportion of Cuyahoga County proper-
ties remaining in REO over time. Homes are remaining in REO 
for longer periods. Among properties that entered REO in 2008, 
nearly four out of 10 remained unsold after 12 months. For 
homes that entered REO from 2000 to 2002, that still-unsold-
after-a-year figure was closer to one in 10. So a bad situation is 
getting worse (Coulton, Mikelbank, and Schramm 2008). 
Properties in REO can be problematic because they are suscepti-
ble to vandalism and property devaluation. It can also be difficult 
for neighbors and others to figure out who owns the property, 
and who should be called or fined when the property is in viola-
tion of housing codes. In Ohio, property owners are supposed to 
record their deeds to identify themselves as owner of record for 
the property. When a property has reverted to a bank in a foreclo-
sure sale, for instance, but the bank has not recorded the deed as 
a matter of public record, the result is administrative confusion. 
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Figure 7. Subprime Foreclosures by Concentration of Loans to African American Borrowers, 2005-07
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Court dockets will indicate ownership by the financial institu-
tion; however, without the deed’s being recorded, the owner 
of public record will be the foreclosed-upon homeowner. This 
discrepancy becomes an issue when properties are cited for code 
violations and other public nuisances. Notices are misdirected and 
repairs delayed, which results in these empty structures continu-
ing to decay. In 2008, Ohio House Bill 1388 was passed that allows 
sheriff ’s departments to record foreclosure deeds on behalf of a 
new owner—a helpful change administratively.
As if having enormous numbers of properties languishing in REO 
were not enough, properties that get stuck in the foreclosure pro-
cess itself can be even more problematic. Consider the following 
scenarios and the potential confusion that surrounds each.
•	 In	one,	a	lender	or	servicer	initiates	foreclosure	proceedings	
against a homeowner but never follows through to comple-
tion. The homeowner, meanwhile, has often left the property, 
believing he has lost rights to the property as a result of the 
foreclosure filing.
Figure 8. Ownership After Foreclosure Sale, 2000-09
Figure 9. Estimated Proportion of Properties Remaining in REO (Survival Function)
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•	 In	another,	a	lender	or	servicer	files	a	foreclosure	proceeding	
and goes along with the case through judgment, but never 
takes that final step of filing an order of sale to prompt the 
court to sell the property. Again, the homeowner has often 
already vacated the home.
•	 In	a	third	scenario,	a	lender	files	an	order	of	sale,	and	then,	
absent a buyer at foreclosure sale, does not purchase the  
property itself.
Incredibly, in all three of these scenarios, called “bank walk-a-
ways,” the homeowner retains responsibility for the taxes and 
maintenance of the property, owing to an Ohio law that stipulates 
the foreclosed homeowner remains the rightful owner until a 
home is sold at foreclosure sale and a foreclosure deed granted. 
This can lead to a number of foreclosed and abandoned properties 
that are unknown to authorities, and can also lead to troubles for 
the homeowner.
The Role of a Housing Court
Judge Raymond Pianka and his court play a visible and critical 
role in establishing and enforcing accountability among owners 
of REO properties as well as those allowing their properties to sit 
vacant and untended (see A Holistic Housing Court). Though 
the court relies on city housing inspectors and prosecutors to 
bring problems to court, once a case arrives in housing court, 
Pianka uses code enforcement as a tool to prevent further home 
and neighborhood deterioration. Lenders and corporations are 
charged heavy fines for failing to maintain the properties they 
own, though these fines are lessened if owners comply with the 
court’s orders. In many instances, these companies are out-of-state 
entities that have purchased multiple properties out of foreclo-
sure, sight unseen. Some simply ignore the summons. Pianka’s 
response? He levies fines of up to $1,000 a day against companies 
that fail to show up to court. 
Pianka and his staff have also partnered with local organizations 
to help address foreclosure at each of three stages: preventing 
foreclosure, managing properties in foreclosure, and finding 
responsible owners when foreclosure can’t be avoided. These 
collaborations have resulted in, among other positive outcomes, 
more homeowners seeking assistance before their loans go into 
foreclosure and the fixing up of properties to address code  
violations.
The courts aren’t the only ones taking action against the  
parties responsible for the devastation in Northeast Ohio. In 
Slavic Village, some residents undertook an investigation on 
their own into speculators who purchased and sold properties in 
their community (see Investigating Mortgage Fraud in Slavic 
Village). A direct result of their efforts is that the Cuyahoga 
County prosecutor, acting on the information gathered by these 
residents, is pursuing brokers and other entities suspected of 
contributing through fraudulent activity to the neighborhood’s 
devastation. Further, the county established a multi-agency task 
force that involves the U.S. attorney, the FBI, HUD’s inspector 
general, the Ohio Attorney General, and the county prosecutor 
to investigate mortgage fraud in Northeast Ohio. 
Although Cleveland’s Housing Court adjudicates cases on a house-by-house basis, its 
work affects entire neighborhoods. The court has made highly creative use of the tools 
at its disposal. To help homeowners cited for housing code violations and headed for 
possible foreclosure avoid that outcome, Housing Court specialists connect them with housing counselors that advocate for mortgage workouts. 
To maintain the value of properties in the process of foreclosure, the court uses NEO CANDO data to send letters to Cleveland homeowners 
in foreclosure informing them of their rights and responsibilities while in foreclosure, and encouraging them to remain in their homes. A letter 
returned to the court is a sign of a vacant property, which puts that foreclosure case on the fast track to protect the property’s value. To keep 
neighbors informed, the court posts information about properties in foreclosure on placards on the property. This action gives neighbors some-
one to contact if they spot problems with the properties. 
The court has also established a firm tone of accountability in Cleveland. It hears cases of nuisance abatement, which allows a court-appointed 
party to take control of a property if it is a public nuisance. The appointed party, usually a community development corporation, can rehabilitate 
the property or demolish it at the negligent owner’s expense. Also, a ‘clean hands’ docket prevents a party from using the civil side of a court 
(for eviction) if there is a pending criminal case (housing code violation) against that party. 
The court also holds banks and investors responsible for the upkeep of their foreclosed and vacant properties. Corporate defenders who don’t 
take the court seriously do so at their peril; those who don’t show up to their court dates prompt the court to try their cases in absentia, ruling 
and assigning fines without a defendant present. 
That tough-stance practice has certainly made corporate defendants take notice—and prompted many more to show up for their court dates. 
More to the point, these negligent corporate property owners are now taking code violations seriously, following up on the citations and making 
ill-tended houses in Cleveland’s neighborhoods more viable candidates for return to productive use. 
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A Holistic Housing Court
Investigating Mortgage Fraud in Slavic Village
For each step forward, it’s been two painful steps back for Slavic Village, 
the once-vibrant Cleveland neighborhood that has been decimated by 
the foreclosure crisis. In one measure of the community’s forward prog-
ress, Slavic Village Development (a community development corporation) 
built and rehabilitated more than 1,500 housing units in this neighbor-
hood of modest homes on narrow, tree-lined streets. Today, nearly the 
same number of Slavic Village homes are in need of demolition. In this 
community, fraud and foreclosure are entwined ills, leaving scores of 
homes abandoned, boarded up, and stripped of virtually all value. 
“We’d drive by a boarded-up house, a teeny little cottage, that 
sold for $80,000 and we knew that this was wrong. We knew 
that there was fraud going on.”
says Marie Kittredge, executive director of Slavic Village  
Development, or SVD.
In mid-2008, a task force comprised of residents, SVD staff and interns, and under the leadership of city councilman Tony Brancatelli, released 
a report on flipping and fraudulent activity in the community between 2003 and 2007. The report defines “flipping” as buying inexpensive 
property (often a foreclosure), making little to no improvements, and selling it at a price higher than the house’s fair market value as assessed 
by the county. The task force examined thousands of “Certificates of Disclosure,” a document required in the City of Cleveland that records the 
appraiser and mortgage broker on a given property transaction. Their research revealed some distinct and troubling patterns between brokers 
and appraisers. 
Using additional data from NEO CANDO, the task force then identified a long list of property transactions where homes were financed with 
a 90 percent loan-to-value ratio, with a second mortgage often making up the difference between the home price and the first loan. These 
homes were then resold—without any construction permits having been filed or any other noticeable improvements made to the property—at a 
200 percent to 600 percent price increase. 
The group submitted the results of their investigation to law-enforcement authorities. Their diligent work eventually led to the indictment of 
three individuals accused of making $5.8 million in fraudulent loans. As of April 16, 2010, two of the defendants had pleaded guilty to mort-
gage fraud-related offenses. 
Unfortunately, there is no shortage of mortgage fraud cases in 
Northeast Ohio. In August 2009, Cuyahoga County indicted 41 
people in a mortgage fraud scheme that involved $44 million and 
more than 450 homes. Nearly 80 percent of the houses caught in 
the scheme were also in foreclosure (Turner 2009).
In other Cleveland neighborhoods, residents and local groups 
have devised novel approaches to the problem of houses sitting 
vacant and vulnerable during the foreclosure process. On one 
street, residents have taken up brushes to brighten empty homes, 
adding painted curtains, flower pots, even silhouettes of people 
inside the home. This aesthetic lift is aimed at deterring vandals, 
squatters, and drug dealers from entering vacant properties, but it 
has also given remaining property owners a sense of control and 
efficacy in their neighborhood. 
Shaker Heights, an inner-ring suburb of some 12,000 households, 
had more than 500 vacant homes at the end of 2008, a fact that 
is not at all apparent driving through the community. The city 
doesn’t allow owners to board up their vacant properties, for 
example; if a homeowner does so, the city removes the plywood, 
replaces broken windows and doors with intact ones, and charges 
the owners not only for materials and labor, but a 20 percent 
surcharge as well. Teeming flower baskets hang from many of the 
city’s street lamps. The baskets are an apparent extravagance in 
these tough economic times, according to the city’s economic 
development director, Kamla Lewis, “but a necessary expense in 
our effort to maintain appearances—and property values.”
Like the Cleveland residents who keep watch over the vacant 
homes in their neighborhoods, Shaker Heights officials hope that 
their efforts are not merely keeping a finger in the dike. 
Stage III: The Future of Foreclosed and REO Properties
Despite government and neighborhood attempts to prevent 
deterioration of empty homes while they slog through foreclosure 
or idle in REO, the desired outcome—sale of these properties to 
owners who will restore the properties to useful purpose—comes 
at an increasingly steep price. In their third report, “Beyond REO,” 
CWRU researchers found that in Cuyahoga County, in the City of 
Cleveland, and in Cleveland’s suburbs, properties sold out of REO 
are selling for far less than their estimated market value before 
foreclosure filing and sale (see figure 10). 
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Figure 10. Value Remaining after Foreclosure Sale as Percentage of Previous Estimated Market Value 
 (in 2009 dollars), 2000-09
Back in 2000, for example, properties sold out of REO were pur-
chased for approximately 75 percent of their previous estimated 
market value. This was true of all three geographies—county, city, 
and suburbs. Not great, houses losing 25 percent of their value 
during the foreclosure process, but not that surprising. By 2007, 
however, properties leaving REO in the City of Cleveland were 
selling for a shocking 13 percent of their estimated market value 
(Coulton, Mikelbank, and Schramm 2008). 
In Cuyahoga County and suburban Cleveland, properties selling 
out of REO in 2007 fared only slightly better, fetching sale prices 
of 22 percent and 37 percent of their estimated market value, 
respectively. For a weak market like Northeast Ohio that saw little 
run-up in housing values in the early 2000s, this precipitous drop 
in home values is a debilitating blow to neighborhoods, communi-
ties, and the entire region (Coulton, Schramm, and Hirsh 2008). 
Evidence of the deterioration in neighborhoods is the fact that REO 
properties up through 2008 were being sold at extremely distressed 
prices—defined as $10,000 or less—mainly to corporations and 
individuals looking for bargains.9 Many of these buyers were from 
outside Ohio. Between 2005 and 2008, REO properties purchased 
at these very low prices made up an increasing percentage of all 
REO properties sold. As shown in figure 11, 4.3 percent of REO 
properties in Cuyahoga County in 2005 were sold at extremely dis-
tressed prices. This proportion skyrocketed to 43 percent in 2008,  
a 10-fold increase (Coulton, Schramm, and Hirsh 2008). 
As is the case with subprime lending, this trend of selling houses 
at extremely low prices has affected the region disproportionately. 
Some neighborhoods are much harder hit than others and, as 
with subprime lending, much of this activity has been concen-
trated on Cleveland’s east side. In 2005, between 7 and 8 percent 
of east-side properties coming out of REO were sold for less than 
$10,000. Three years later, nearly 80 percent of the more than 
2,770 properties on the east side sold out of REO were purchased 
at these extremely distressed prices (Coulton, Schramm, and 
Hirsh 2008). It is hoped that the implementation of Neighbor-
hood Stabilization Program plans will lead to some of these 
low-value REO properties being acquired by local governments 
and nonprofits, to be rehabilitated or demolished and returned to 
productive use as residences or green space. 
Houses for Mere Thousands, Purchased Sight Unseen
The trend of buying and selling homes for such low prices raises 
a number of questions. Who is selling these properties at such 
low prices, and who is buying them? What proportion of the 
transactions are leading to productive uses of these properties? 
To better understand the market forces at work in these transac-
tions, community development professionals and local research-
ers teamed up to investigate the questions above. Locating 
concrete data on the condition of properties after REO and on 
buyers and sellers of these properties is difficult. Nevertheless, 
their research findings shed some light on what’s been happen-
ing in Cleveland, and point to some potential reasons why it has 
been so difficult to stop or even slow the process. 
One key finding, for example, is that a small number of sellers 
are making most of these sales. The data records of thousands of 
houses sold in Cuyahoga County in 2007 and 2008 for $10,000 
or less reveal that, although numerous financial institution are 
involved in these sales, the top 10 sellers of REO properties for 
$10,000 or less account for 72 percent of these transactions (see 
figure 12) (Coulton, Schramm, and Hirsh 2008). 
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Another finding is that houses sold at $10,000 or less are making 
up substantial percentages of all REO properties sold by some 
individual banks or mortgage companies. However, this finding 
is less interpretable, because of the difficulty of identifying the 
responsible entity via public records data. It is important to note 
that while public record indicates the party that holds title to a 
property, it is often the case that a bank or lender has hired a ser-
vicer to handle transactions related to the property. Such opacity 
makes any transactions related to these properties very difficult 
(Coulton, Schramm, and Hirsh 2008). 
On the purchasing side, data reveal that there were many buyers 
of these properties—more than 1,200—with only a handful buy-
ing groups of more than 100 properties in the City of Cleveland. 
Here, too, the data are not always indicative of what’s happening. 
Buyers may purchase properties under many different auspices, 
for instance, and may own many more properties than public 
records show. By and large, however, buyers are out-of-state 
corporations or investors. These investors typically have rela-
tionships with sellers of REO properties. Some sellers package 
properties regionally and sell to their customers in bulk; almost 
all properties are sold sight unseen. These transactions, which are 
collectively defining and reshaping some neighborhoods in the 
region, are often being conducted by individuals who have never 
been to Northeast Ohio (Coulton, Schramm, and Hirsh 2008).
In fact, the data reveal other interesting patterns, some unsurpris-
ing, others disquieting, about these transactions. The majority of 
these properties become tax delinquent. Many are resold quickly 
in very poor condition with only a small price increase. Some of 
these bulk purchasers are adopting business models that involve 
land contracts, direct financing to homebuyers, and other tools 
that are outside the mainstream real estate market practices 
(Coulton, Schramm, and Hirsh 2008). 
Since this phenomenon is so new, the success of this private-
market model of moving REO property back to occupancy 
and productive use cannot yet be evaluated. In addition to this 
market process, nonprofits, governments, and community devel-
opment corporations have begun developing a more promising 
model of bringing properties back to productive use. Some of 
these efforts, including the county land bank, are discussed in 
the following section.
From Downward Spiral to Productive Reuse
It’s a tremendous challenge for any region to face, let alone one 
struggling with double-digit unemployment and anticipating  
another wave of foreclosures. What’s the best way for local leaders to 
help move these vast quantities of houses back into productive use? 
A critical component is financing. The federal Neighborhood Stabi-
lization Program (NSP) is a crucial aspect of this equation, allotting 
funds to localities so they may be used to meet that locality’s specific 
needs. NSP funds in Cleveland and Cuyahoga County help support 
the demolition and remediation of these vacant and abandoned 
properties. A consortium of public agencies has been awarded NSP 
II dollars that will direct additional remediation efforts to selected 
hard-hit neighborhoods with strong market potential. 
Another critical component of any such restorative effort is con-
necting REO properties to organizations and people who can 
bring them back to occupancy or productive use. On a national 
level, there are two organizations that acquire REO properties 
and connect them to local organizations: The nonprofit National 
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Figure 11. Percentage of All REO Properties Sold at $10,000 or Less of All Properties 
 Leaving REO (in 2009 dollars), 2005-09
Source: Tabulation by Center on Urban Poverty 
and Community Development of Cuyahoga County 
Auditor Data.
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Community Stabilization Trust (NCST) was formed in 2008 by 
six national nonprofits with expertise in community develop-
ment and housing. The REO Clearinghouse, a for-profit agency 
formed by Safeguard Properties, was established in early 2009. 
Both agencies’ purpose is to help stem the decline of communi-
ties with high concentrations of vacant and abandoned property, 
and both work to connect national-level servicers with local 
community development organizations, offering foreclosed 
properties to these organizations at discounted rates. Cleveland 
was one of the first cities to work with NCST and the REO 
Clearinghouse. Current work is small in scale and strategically 
focused on very specific areas, and will help inform and direct 
broader efforts going forward. 
On a local level, once an organization establishes a connection 
with holders of REO properties—a sometimes difficult step—it 
can employ one of several measures to return properties to viable 
use. One new approach is the recently established county land 
bank, whose primary function is to help return vacant and aban-
doned properties in Cuyahoga County to productive use. The 
county land bank, which is structured as a county land reutiliza-
tion corporation, is modeled after a highly successful program in 
Genesee County, Michigan (see Cuyahoga County Land Bank). 
In Ohio, vacant land that is tax delinquent is sold without appraisal 
to the highest bidder for the amount of taxes, penalties, interest, 
assessments, and charges against the land, plus court costs. Going 
forward, the process will be much more efficient. The land bank 
can acquire tax-foreclosed lands for a nominal price, along with 
select lands forfeited to the state. It can also accept property in lieu 
of foreclosure from the owner of tax-delinquent land. The land 
bank manages its lands and can sell and oversee development of 
the lands in its purview provided the goal is reuse.
The land bank can help further both community and regional 
revitalization efforts. By strategically amassing parcels of land, the 
county’s land bank can help communities implement plans for 
communal green spaces. Pooling properties in the new land bank 
will also mitigate the risks associated with land ownership, which 
previously were borne by small, local CDCs. These same CDCs 
are expected to play a central role in getting land bank properties 
back on the market. 
In December 2009, the Cuyahoga County land bank announced 
a landmark deal with secondary mortgage market giant Fannie 
Mae. The secondary mortgage market giant owns hundreds of 
foreclosed and abandoned properties in the Cleveland area, 
many of which bear houses in likely need of demolition. In the 
deal, the land bank will be able to purchase properties from Fan-
nie Mae for $1 each. In addition, Fannie Mae agreed to pay up to 
$3,500 of demolition costs on each property. Going forward, the 
land bank will have the option to purchase any of Fannie Mae’s 
foreclosed properties valued at less than $25,000; those proper-
ties the land bank elects not to purchase (it has 30 days to evalu-
ate them for acquisition) will be offered for sale to the wider 
market. The deal marks a significant step forward for the land 
bank. Prior to the announcement of this arrangement, the land 
bank had acquired some 20 properties, with several dozen more 
under evaluation. Its first transfer from Fannie Mae consists of 
25 additional properties for the land bank. 
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Figure 12. Top Sellers of REO Properties, Cuyahoga County, 2007-08
Seller
REO Properties  
sold by seller,  
all prices
Number of REO 
properties sold 
$10,000 or less
Percent of  
total REO  
properties sold
Percent of REO  
properties sold  
for $10,000 or  
less by seller
Deutsche Bank National Trust 1,638 837 20% 51%
Wells Fargo 1,273 601 14% 47%
U.S. Bank National Association 1,054 445 11% 42%
Fannie Mae 1,292 361 9% 28%
Bank of New York 638 219 5% 34%
LaSalle Bank National Association 365 184 4% 50%
HSBC Bank 330 133 3% 40%
JP Morgan Chase Bank 254 103 2% 41%
Wachovia Bank 176 85 2% 48%
Homecoming Financial Network 122 50 1% 41%
Total (top sellers) 7,142 3,018 72% 67%
Total REO properties sold, all sellers 10,728 4,210
Source: Cuyahoga County Auditor transfer data from NEO CANDO, Center on Urban Poverty and Community Development, Mandel School of 
Applied Social Sciences, Case Western Reserve University. http://neocando.case.edu.
Finally, efforts are underway at the neighborhood level to help 
prevent homes from deteriorating, whether they are occupied 
or temporarily vacant. Two programs that focus on home 
rehabilitation to keep neighborhoods in shape are Opportunity 
Homes and Home Repair Resource Center (see Opportunity 
Homes and Maintaining Home and Neighborhood Value). 
Northeast Ohio has many programs that, like these two, comple-
ment efforts at the city and county level aimed at combating the 
foreclosure crisis. The region’s multifaceted, coordinated, and 
extensive response is indeed a reflection of the willful persever-
ance of residents, community-based organizations, and city and 
county officials alike. 
Conclusions and Policy Considerations
This report weaves together data on the foreclosure crisis in the 
Cleveland area with stories of how the community is responding. 
In so doing, it provides a contextualized account of the facts, 
rather than a causal analysis, and aims to inform and contribute 
to recovery efforts taking place in communities across the  
nation. While it may be tempting to try to pinpoint who or  
what is to blame, the data are not up to revealing motives, nor  
to sorting out the influences of market forces, regulatory failures, 
and institutional and individual decisions. Nevertheless, the 
numbers and stories together paint a picture of what unfolded 
here, what the consequences have been, and what the commu-
nity has been called upon to address.
To summarize what the data reveal, Cleveland and Cuyahoga 
County entered this decade with a modestly appreciating housing 
market, a manageable number of foreclosures, and a community 
development system set up to help return vacant properties to 
productive use. Then subprime mortgages arrived on the scene 
and, in some sections of the city and suburbs, rapidly supplanted 
One of the biggest challenges facing Cuyahoga County in addressing the 
growing problem posed by abandoned and vacant properties is how to keep 
foreclosed properties out of the hands of speculators and make them available 
to private investors and CDCs as part of neighborhood revitalization strategies. 
The solution, championed by Cuyahoga County Treasurer Jim Rokakis, was 
state legislation (Ohio SB 353), which passed on December 10, 2008, and 
authorizes a countywide “land bank” that would function as a mechanism to 
accelerate the reutilization of these distressed properties.
The goals for the land bank are to
• Facilitate the reclamation, rehabilitation, and reutilization of vacant,  
 abandoned, tax foreclosed, or other real property
• Efficiently hold and manage that real property pending its reclamation,  
 rehabilitation, and reutilization
• Assist governmental entities and other nonprofit or for-profit entities  
 in the assembly of that real property and the clearing of title in a  
 coordinated manner
• Promote economic and housing development of the county or region
The legislation authorized the creation of a Community Improvement Corporation (CIC) known as the Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization  
Corporation (LRC). This program allows officials in the state’s most populous county to set up a nonprofit land reutilization program to accept or  
buy foreclosed or abandoned properties. The land bank is able to demolish properties beyond repair, while others can be held in a trust.
The LRC’s jurisdiction initially is limited to Cuyahoga County; however, the legislation authorizes any county adjoining Cuyahoga County to 
designate the LRC as its county land reutilization corporation by entering into an agreement with the LRC. The legislation allows selected non-
productive land to be sold without appraisal for the amount of taxes, penalties, interest, assessments, and charges against the land plus court 
costs. The LRC has the authority to sell land, without competitive bidding, but for its fair market value, to any person it chooses so long as it 
obtains covenants from the buyer to assure the land’s effective reutilization.
The primary sources of funding for the LRC’s operations are penalties and interest paid on current taxes and assessments that are not 
paid when due. Rokakis estimates that capturing the penalties and interest on delinquent taxes could provide an annual amount to fund 
the activities of the county land bank of approximately $7 million. The treasurer also anticipates secondary sources of funding such as  
re-sale of acquired properties to qualified buyers, fees for managing mothballed properties, plus a few other local government revenues. 
In addition, the LRC is authorized to borrow money, issue bonds, accept gifts, and apply in its own name for grants. 
Cuyahoga County Land Bank
20
conventional loans as the primary product for home purchases 
and refinances. By 2005, more than 10,000 foreclosures were filed 
on residential properties in a single year. The sheer numbers of 
foreclosures quickly overwhelmed the system. Neighborhoods 
with large minority populations were particularly hard hit by fore-
closures and the negative spillover effects.
The data also document a growing number of properties that  
entered prolonged periods of vacancy, stuck either in the fore-
closure process or in REO portfolios of mortgage companies 
and servicers. Untended properties deteriorated and were  
vandalized, reducing the likelihood that these houses could be 
sold and reoccupied. The value of housing stock plummeted, 
leading speculators to buy properties in some neighborhoods  
in bulk and for pennies on the dollar.
The data reveal all of this. Going forward, evidence-based  
research will continue to reveal which places and groups are 
most negatively affected, what progress is being made in  
addressing the crisis, and what challenges remain.
The sidebar stories, on the other hand, illustrate some of the 
ways that local government, nonprofit organizations, and com-
munity groups mobilized to address the problems spawned by 
this crisis. Each of these stories demonstrates that coordinated 
and data-driven action is needed on many interrelated fronts, 
and exemplifies the value of cooperation among several levels of 
government, nonprofit organizations, community leaders, and 
local citizens. And the stories are still being written.
Beyond such responses, what more is needed for communities 
like Cleveland to weather this crisis and prevent similar situations 
in the future? We have certainly learned a great deal from our 
experiences. From where we stand, then, as a weak-market city 
planning to rebuild from this crisis, we acknowledge the need to 
address three key areas. The first involves regulatory reform of both 
consumer protections and the credit system as a whole. The  
second has to do with preserving and expanding affordable  
housing options. The third involves policies that enable cities like 
Cleveland to reconstitute a smaller, sustainable housing market 
within the context of a strong regional economy. 
1. Implement appropriate incentive schemes and monitoring  
 mechanisms to strengthen consumer protections.
Foreclosures are tremendously costly to the neighborhoods in 
which they concentrate, and their impact is long lasting. Spillover 
costs, which mushroom as houses remain vacant, are borne by 
neighbors, local government, and philanthropic organizations. 
Whether due to lack of incentives or insufficient capacity, loan 
modifications by lenders and servicers, many of which have no 
local connection, have done little to slow the pace of foreclo-
sures and keep families in their homes. Consequently, costs for 
maintaining properties have skyrocketed while at the same time 
many servicers are refusing to spend dollars on property upkeep. 
A proposed way to mitigate this problem requires servicers to 
escrow nuisance-abatement funds at the time a foreclosure is filed 
(Mallach 2009). Enforcing the escrow requirement could boost 
servicers’ incentives to modify distressed loans when possible. 
When a loan can’t be saved, these escrowed funds would be avail-
able for upkeep of the property post-foreclosure, freeing the city’s 
resources to support, for example, foreclosure prevention efforts. 
An innovative partnership among a funding intermediary, community development corporations, 
neighborhood organizers, and a local university is helping to preserve home and neighborhood  
values in Cuyahoga County. The intermediary is Neighborhood Progress Inc. (NPI), a well-known and highly respected community development 
group that took the lead in assembling this partnership. The partnership’s unique initiative is called Opportunity Homes. 
A pilot initiative operating in six of Cleveland’s neighborhoods, Opportunity Homes has three components: rehabbing homes, demolishing 
homes, and preventing foreclosures through data-driven strategic organizing. With $21 million of funding, Opportunity Homes plans on  
rehabilitating 121 homes and demolishing another 100 of the most deteriorated vacant homes in the six neighborhoods—Slavic Village,  
Tremont, Buckeye–Shaker, Fairfax, Glenville, and Detroit–Shoreway. (These six neighborhoods are also NPI’s six Strategic Investment Areas, 
areas competitively chosen for investment on the basis of strengths such as location, number of community institutions, and effectiveness  
of local CDCs and on potential for revitalization.) 
The rehabilitated homes will feature energy efficiency, tax abatements, and affordable 
pricing. On the other side of the coin, the demolition of badly deteriorated homes will rid 
the neighborhoods of blighted property and create room for other types of investment. 
Opportunities for using the space post-demolition include constructing new homes, 
establishing communal green spaces, and expanding yards. 
The third component of the initiative, foreclosure prevention, is called “Early Warning.” 
Through Early Warning, the partnership identifies mortgages at risk of foreclosure, 
contacts the homeowners, and engages them in foreclosure counseling. Such targeting 
of foreclosure-prevention efforts helps the partnership reach out to vulnerable home-
owners in a time- and cost-efficient manner, with the goal of modifying an unaffordable 
loan before a homeowner defaults. 
Opportunity Homes
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“The volume of houses in need of repair is so 
great that we simply can’t handle it all,” 
explains Frank Ford, senior vice president for 
research and development at NPI.
“Opportunity Homes builds off existing assets  
in neighborhoods, like new schools, libraries, 
and green space. No one can afford to fix 
everything; you have to work strategically.”
Maintaining Home and Neighborhood Value 
The Home Repair Resource Center (HRRC) in Cleveland Heights, an inner-ring suburb on Cleveland’s hard-hit east side, is a 
small, community-based organization with a big mission. Founded in 1971 by members of a local congregation, the agency 
enables community members to maintain their homes, helping keep the neighborhood competitive and marketable. 
The organization’s comprehensive programming is aimed at preventing both foreclosure and home deterioration. A 
HUD-approved foreclosure education and counseling agency, the Home Repair Resource Center also offers financial  
literacy classes. And the center has at least one unique offering: education and resources centered on home repairs. 
One program helps low- and moderate-income homeowners get quality home-repair loans. A how-to home-repair  
program for all residents teaches participants specific home-repair skills. Finally, a tool-loan program allows income-
eligible residents to use expensive tools to complete repair and maintenance work to their properties. In 2008, HRRC 
enabled 245 households to complete nearly $700,500 in home repairs. 
And the organization is now rolling up its sleeves and doing repair work itself. In response to the current need for  
quality home rehabilitation, the center created its Home in the Heights program. Through a partnership with the City of 
Cleveland Heights, HRRC can purchase foreclosed homes at low prices and rehabilitate the property in order to sell it. 
“There’s a lot of rehab going on out there,” acknowledges HRRC executive director Kathryn Lad. 
“We’re not going to flip a house; we want to raise the value of all the houses on the street.  
We’re not interested in doing just the minimal.” 
Profits from the sale of these rehabbed houses will fund future home purchases and rehabilitation. HRRC recently 
obtained its first property and has begun rehabilitation work. Best of all, there’s a buyer already lined up. 
People often ask Lad why organizations similar to HRRC do not exist in their own communities. “This organization was 
started by grassroots people,” she tells them. “If you want something like this in your community, then do something 
about it. We were founded by a small group of people that wanted to make a difference in our community.” 
“People,” she emphasized, “made it happen.” 
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If not accompanied by effective enforcement, however, such an  
option might simply result in more homes falling through the 
cracks.
In Cleveland’s low-income neighborhoods, increased access to 
credit was mainly provided in the form of subprime loans. The 
companies originating a large proportion of these loans relied 
heavily on independent mortgage brokers who had monetary 
incentives to originate loans that carried not only higher interest 
rates, but higher costs and higher borrower risk as well.10 Moreover, 
brokers throughout Ohio could operate unscreened for criminal 
records. In too many instances loans were made based on inflated 
appraisals and inadequate documentation. In fact, until 2007  
appraisers in Ohio were not required to be licensed. And although 
local leaders recognized the dangers early on, they were unsuccess-
ful in passing laws to control predatory lending back in 2004.11
Today, despite increased enforcement and some long-awaited 
anti-predatory lending rules now in place, consumers still need 
better protections. In particular, these protections should focus 
on low-income, less sophisticated consumers, operating in an 
imperfectly competitive market where mortgage products are 
complicated and risky. Relying on disclosure mandates and 
financial education programs has proven not to be enough. 
However, defining and implementing these protections are 
challenging tasks, and as it should be, are currently at the heart 
of heated debates in policy circles. The experience in Cleveland 
suggests appropriate incentive schemes and monitoring as tools 
for consumer protection. 
Incentives: It is known that innovation outpaces regulation. With 
securitization, the mortgage-related financial market operated 
under an originate-and-distribute model, in which incentives were 
misaligned among brokers, originators, and mortgage holders. 
Reforms regarding expansion of assignee liability provisions and 
setting broker fees independently from the type of mortgage origi-
nated can help align incentives between all parties and are likely to 
improve outcomes. Reforms applied equally to loan originators, 
mortgage brokers, and lender employees (i.e., “loan officers” and 
“mortgage bankers”) may be most effective. According to legal 
experts at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, the imposition 
of assignee liability to ensure that markets internalize the cost of 
unlawful loan originations will in turn encourage the secondary 
mortgage market to more carefully police loan originators, by 
cutting off funding to those who make mortgage loans via legally 
suspect methods (Greenlee and Fitzpatrick 2009). In other words, 
it will cut off funding to unscrupulous brokers by increasing the 
funders’ responsibility.
An alternative approach is to impose a “duty of care” along with 
assignee liability. Basically, a duty of care is a legal requirement 
that a person act toward others with the attention and caution a 
reasonable person in the circumstances would exhibit. Thus, if 
loan originators owed a duty of care to borrowers, then borrowers 
might be able to recover monetary losses for having been put into 
bad loans, even if no outright fraud was committed. This can be 
an advantage both to borrowers and to communities, as fraud is 
extremely difficult and costly to prove in court even in the more 
obvious cases—and especially with signed disclosures that may 
or may not have been read. Originators would be far more careful 
in making loans if they felt a greater liability for the loans’ positive 
outcomes.
Monitoring: Data is an important resource for monitoring fair 
lending and screening better performing lending products. Low-
cost mechanisms for monitoring and screening have appeared in 
some markets (web-based ratings for online sellers, for instance), 
helping consumers make better decisions and sort the bad prod-
ucts out of the market. While HMDA has allowed monitoring of 
the provision of credit, additional data elements on the terms and 
performance of the loan are needed to assess the quality of loan 
products through time. In the absence of such additional data, the 
identification of harmful products and protecting consumers from 
them will rely primarily on anecdotal evidence, which is neither 
an efficient nor especially promising approach to either task. 
Cleveland’s example shows that inadequate regulation and  
perverse incentives are conducive to criminal activity, too. 
Today a Cleveland-area task force is engaged in the prosecution 
of scores of individuals who took advantage of the situation. In 
the future, these types of criminal enterprises can be prevented 
by having the tools in place to prevent the perpetration of and 
victimization by such activities.
2. Preserve and expand the supply of affordable housing  
 options, including sustainable homeownership and rental  
 opportunities.
Many of Cleveland’s housing units that cycle through an  
extended period of REO, vacancy, and resale at distressed prices 
will end up being demolished. This is especially likely in neigh-
borhoods with lots of foreclosures. What this means is that 
the low- and moderate-income renters and homeowners who 
occupied these units will need a place to live. While demolition 
presents an opportunity to reduce concentrated poverty and 
adjust housing supply to the area’s shrinking number of house-
holds, it can’t be the only step to enable low- and moderate-
income families to relocate to decent housing in mixed-income 
areas. Without attention to both the ability of households to pay 
for housing and the adequacy and location of affordable housing 
stock, concentrated poverty neighborhoods may simply be  
recreated elsewhere.
The foreclosure crisis represents an opportunity for the federal 
government to recommit itself to affordable housing programs. 
This includes expansion of the Housing Choice Voucher  
program, increased funding for both the Housing Trust Fund and 
the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, and additional programs 
to help homebuyers who, upon the purchase of their first home, 
were affected by predatory lending. 
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A regional approach could employ data to calibrate the right mix 
between demand and supply-side solutions. Now is a favorable 
time for local groups to encourage green building methods and 
mixed-income developments. In places like Cleveland, distressed 
properties that have been purchased out of REO and recycled 
back into low-cost rentals with only cosmetic changes pose health 
hazards that likely worsened during the structures’ prolonged 
vacancy. Increased resources for health inspections, enforcement, 
and remediation are necessary to protect new occupants.
3. Support strategic neighborhood investments within a  
 strong, thriving regional economy. 
In the wake of the mortgage crisis, hard-hit areas in Cleveland 
and the inner-ring suburbs face hundreds of vacant and aban-
doned homes and the effects are spilling over in the form of falling 
property values, diminished local tax revenues, and growing costs 
of nuisance abatement. The clean-up will take many years, and cur-
rently available NSP funds are simply not enough to mitigate more 
than a small proportion of these properties. Multiyear funding for 
neighborhood stabilization is required, but it must be deployed 
strategically given the realities within the region. Cleveland will 
likely never regain its past stature as a dynamic industrial city with 
close to a million residents. Looking toward a future in which 
Cleveland is a thriving, stable smaller city that anchors an econom-
ically viable region, planners have embarked on a new approach to 
economic development. The City Planning Commission, working 
with Kent State University’s Cleveland Urban Design Collabora-
tive, has prepared a plan called “Re-Imagining a More Sustainable 
Cleveland.” It outlines a series of revitalization projects that make 
use of the city’s glut of vacant and blighted land and help preserve 
home values in neighborhoods within a shrinking city (see Plan-
ning and Preserving for the Future). 
Of course, success in all three of these key areas will depend on 
many factors, among them the ready availability of good data and 
researchers to make sense of them. In this report, we detailed 
specific challenges facing Northeast Ohio; in order to do so, we 
relied on data that had been collected for years leading up to the 
crisis. Data is a critical tool in the fight against foreclosures and 
their aftermath, as illustrated in each of the sidebar stories.  
Continued, consistent data collection and ongoing research—
both costly undertakings—are critical for any community 
dealing with a problem of this magnitude. Unfortunately, for-
profit companies are the primary providers in many regions of 
foreclosure-related data. Some government agencies also make 
foreclosure-related data available, and for free; however, their 
collection ability is limited and reporting methods varied. An 
integrated, real-time data system will require cooperation among 
a number of government agencies willing to modify how they 
collect, integrate, and distribute combined information so that it 
can be used for the common good. In addition to the availability 
of data, communities must have capacity to analyze the data and 
identify meaningful research questions. 
An Uncertain Future
At this point it is unclear when the crisis will abate and markets 
resume their normal functioning. What is clear, however, is that 
efforts to address the crisis—here or in any community across 
the nation—must be multifaceted and coordinated among  
various entities. Similarly, policies aimed at dealing with disrup-
tions in the housing market should be conceived as part of an 
integrated set of policies that can help weaker markets, with their 
unique circumstances, recover and thrive.
Supported by the recount of the crisis in our region, we have 
pointed to three general policy issues that need to be addressed: 
regulatory reform, housing policy reform, and economic devel-
opment policies in line with a new identity of a smaller region 
with a higher quality of life. Let us not forget, however, that in 
the broader scheme of issues, our region has much work to do 
regarding education quality and persistent racial disparities in 
well-being.
Cleveland has been characterized as “resilient,” with collabora-
tive efforts among many players taking place horizontally across 
communities as well as vertically with the county (Swanstrom, 
Chapple, and Immergluck 2009). Yet, despite these efforts, 
resources are sparse. In the midst of the crisis, an opportunity 
for greater community cohesion with a focus on recovery stands 
clear. It challenges all parties involved—from government  
officials to funders to community organizations—to rethink and 
adapt their roles toward ensuring the Northeast Ohio region 
emerges from this crisis stronger than before.
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Planning and Preserving for the Future 
As population decline and foreclosure leave neighborhoods 
filled with vacant lots, city and neighborhood planners  
contemplate ways to use vacant land productively while  
fostering sustainability and future growth. In 2007, the  
Cleveland Planning Commission released Connecting  
Cleveland 2020, a citywide plan emphasizing the importance 
of neighborhoods, people, and environmental sustainability 
over traditional development and growth. 
“We are looking at the very complex issue of vacant land, its 
aesthetic and economic impacts. If we are successful at using 
these opportunities, we could see Cleveland evolve literally  
to a green city on a blue lake,” says Chief City Planner Fred  
Collier, also the project manager of Connecting Cleveland 
2020. 
Neighborhood Progress Inc., a community development 
funding intermediary, called together Kent State University’s 
Cleveland Urban Design Collaborative and the City of  
Cleveland Planning Commission to explore strategies for 
reuse of Cleveland’s vacant land, forming the Cleveland  
Land Lab. In November 2008, the Cleveland Land Lab  
authored “Re-Imagining a More Sustainable Cleveland: 
Citywide Strategies for Managing Vacancy,” outlining specific 
green and productive ways to reuse vacant land. 
“It’s become increasingly clear that the market can’t support dense,  
mixed-use development in every neighborhood,”  
says Terry Schwarz, senior planner with the Cleveland Urban Design Collaborative. 
 
“So we began to ask questions about economically productive,  
non-traditional uses for surplus vacant land.”  
The report explores expanding parks, stormwater management, biodiversity, remediation of contaminated sites, and 
infill development as strategies for coping with vacant land and population loss, evaluating the potential of each strategy 
and mapping out which strategies fit where. 
The City of Cleveland adopted the report as a long-term, strategic planning goal and is currently raising funds to imple-
ment over 100 pilot projects based on recommendations from the report. The pilot projects will be evaluated, aiming to 
increase the scale of the most successful ones. 
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1. A report written by Kermit Lind of Cleveland State University provides 
details of the early thoughts and actions of those working in or closely 
with Cleveland’s community development community. For more informa-
tion see “The Perfect Storm: An Eyewitness Report from Ground Zero in 
Cleveland’s Neighborhoods” (available online at www.vacantproperties.
org/resources/documents/ThePerfectStorm.pdf). 
2. Three papers published by the Center on Urban Poverty and 
Community Development form the basis of this report: “Pathways to 
Foreclosure: A Longitudinal Study of Mortgage Loans, Cleveland and 
Cuyahoga County, 2005–2008”; “Foreclosure and Beyond: A Report on 
Ownership and Housing Values Following Sheriff’s Sales, Cleveland and 
Cuyahoga County, 2000–2007”; and “Beyond REO: Property Transfers 
of Extremely Distressed Prices in Cuyahoga County, 2005–2008.” These 
research papers document successive stages of foreclosure, from loan 
origination through foreclosure and sheriff’s sale, to REO (real-estate-
owned) status and its aftermath. The examples of local responses that we 
include in this report are gleaned from two papers published by the Levin 
College of Urban Affairs at Cleveland State University: “Responding to 
Foreclosures in Cuyahoga County: An Assessment of Progress,  
Responding to Foreclosures in Cuyahoga County: A Pilot Initiative,”  
and “Responding to Foreclosures in Cuyahoga County: Program Year 
Three Evaluation Report.” 
3. Properties proceed through the foreclosure process to varying 
degrees. For example, some will proceed all the way through, from filing 
to foreclosure sale to reuse and renewed occupancy. Some properties 
will go through foreclosure sale only to end up with a new, non-resident 
owner who may neglect it. And some properties may be abandoned 
earlier in the process, as will be discussed in this report. 
4. Subprime loan: If the annual percentage rate (APR) of the loan is 
more than 3 percent (or 5 percent in the case of junior-liens) above 
the yield of a Treasury security of comparable maturity at the time the 
loan was made, the loan is classified as high cost. This is a proxy for 
subprime lending. In the study, we refer to these as subprime loans. It 
should be noted that such high-cost loans can be made by any lender, 
not just those classified as subprime lenders by HUD (the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development). Additionally, there is no other infor-
mation in HMDA (Home Mortgage Data Act) to indicate whether the loan 
has other features, such as variable interest or prepayment penalties, 
that could affect foreclosure. 
5. This report includes original data and analyses from three studies by 
CWRU’s Center on Urban Poverty and Community Development (see 
endnote 2). This report also updates the data and analyses of these 
three reports to include information from 2008 and 2009. “Pathways  
to Foreclosure” was updated to include loans originated in 2007, and  
observed loans through early 2009. “Foreclosure and Beyond” and  
“Beyond REO” were both updated to include information from 2008  
and 2009.
6. By linking HMDA and local records, researchers were able to examine 
the influence of subprime lending on foreclosures while also taking into 
account other characteristics of lenders, loans, borrowers, and neighbor-
hoods. Furthermore, local records can be tapped to describe the pathway 
that high-cost subprime loans traverse from origination to foreclosure. 
7. Lenders have always had an advantageous position at auction, in 
that they can acquire a property at foreclosure sale for what is called 
a ‘credit bid,’ or the remaining lien on the property, without expending 
additional funds. 
8. Ohio House Bill 138 in the 127th General Assembly. More information 
is available at www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText127/127_HB_138_
EN_N.pdf.
9. Properties with a sales price of $0 in local records are treated as 
missing data in this study. Sales price in the Cuyahoga County auditor’s 
property transfer records use a property transaction’s conveyance fee 
to calculate the sales price of a property. If a conveyance fee was not 
required, a sales price may be listed as $0, regardless of the actual sale 
price of a property. Property transfers at a price of $0 have therefore 
been eliminated from the study, as their actual sales price cannot be 
determined. The Ohio Revised Code (§319.54) exempts governmental 
organizations and nonprofit organizations (among other parties and  
situations) from paying a conveyance fee on a property transfer. There-
fore, the sales prices are most often missing for transfers from HUD 
(80.43 percent, or 941 properties) and Freddie Mac (61.43 percent,  
or 215 properties). Also, quite a few transfers from the Veteran’s  
Administration are missing sales prices (60.74 percent, or 99  
properties). However, Fannie Mae has few missing values (1.08 percent, 
or 16 properties).
10. For example, rate sheets would often provide increased margin for 
loan originators if loans included prepayment penalties (thus increasing 
both the cost of ARMs and the risk that they would not be able to be 
refinanced if housing prices remained flat). 
11. This case involved three local ordinances adopted by the City of 
Cleveland in 2002, pursuant to the home rule amendment, that pro-
hibited various “predatory” practices by consumer lending institutions 
doing business in the city. Shortly after they were adopted, the Cleveland 
ordinances were challenged in a court action initiated by the American 
Financial Services Association (AFSA). AFSA asserted that the Cleveland 
ordinances were in conflict with legislation enacted earlier in 2002 by 
the Ohio General Assembly, Sub. H.B. 386, which established regulatory 
guidelines applicable to all residential mortgage lenders doing business 
in Ohio. One provision in the bill, codified as O. R.C. §1.63, stated the 
legislature’s intent to “preempt” the entire field of mortgage lending 
regulation for the state and included language barring local governments 
anywhere in Ohio from enacting local mortgage lending regulations. 
From McGlinchey Stafford Client Alert: Ohio Supreme Court Decides the 
Cleveland Predatory Lending Ordinance Case.
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Making Data Accessible
For more information about the Center on Urban Poverty and  
Community Development’s NEO CANDO data system, visit  
http://neocando.case.edu, or contact Michael Schramm by phone  
at 216.368.0206 or by email at schramm@case.edu.
Vacant and Abandoned Properties Action Council
For more information about the Vacant and Abandoned Properties  
Action Council, contact Frank Ford, Neighborhood Progress, Inc.,  
by phone at 216.830.2770.
For more information on how the National Vacant Properties Campaign 
can help your city, visit www.vacantproperties.org.
Responsible Neighborhood Lending
For more information about the Home Today program, contact Third 
Federal Savings and Loan at 216.441.7345, or visit their website at 
www.hometoday.org.
Foreclosure Counseling: Different Agencies, Different Approaches
ESOP
For more information about ESOP, call 877.731.3767, or visit  
www.esop-cleveland.org.
Neighborhood Housing Services of Greater Cleveland
NHSGC currently serves residents in Erie, Huron, Lorain, and Medina 
counties, as well as residents of Cleveland and Cuyahoga County. For 
more information about Neighborhood Housing Services of Greater 
Cleveland, visit www.nhscleveland.org.
A Holistic Housing Court
For a more comprehensive list and descriptions the Cleveland Housing 
Court’s programs, visit www.clevelandhousingcourt.org.
Investigating Mortgage Fraud in Slavic Village
For more information about Slavic Village Development Corporation, 
please call 216.429.1182 or visit www.slavicvillage.org.
Cuyahoga County Land Bank
For more information about the Cuyahoga County Land Bank, visit  
www.cuyahogalandbank.org.
Maintaining Home and Neighborhood Value
For more information about the Home Repair Resource Center,  
visit www.hrrc-ch.org, or call 216.381.6100.
Opportunity Homes
For more information about the Opportunity Homes initiative, visit  
Neighborhood Progress, Inc.’s website at www.neighborhoodprogress.org 
or call 216.830.2770.
Planning and Preserving for the Future
For more information about the Cleveland Planning Commission, visit 
http://planning.city.cleveland.oh.us.
You can find Connecting Cleveland 2020 at  
http://planning.city.cleveland.oh.us/cwp/contents.html.
You can find the report “Re-Imagining a More Sustainable Cleveland” 
online at www.cudc.kent.edu/shrink/.
For more information about the Cleveland Land Lab, contact Terry 
Schwarz by phone at 216.357.3426 or by email at tschwarz@kent.edu.
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